

















Investment in the Electric 
Power Industry through a 
Price Floor for Emissions 
Trading 
By Alexander Brauneis, Institute of 
Financial Management, Alpen-Adria-
University Klagenfurt 
Michael Loretz, Roland Mestel, 
and Stefan Palan, Institute of Banking 
and Finance, Karl-Franzens-University 
Graz 
 
 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it 
 
Climate Change and Sustainable Development Series 
Editor: Carlo Carraro 
 
Inducing Low-Carbon Investment in the Electric Power 
Industry through a Price Floor for Emissions Trading 
By Alexander Brauneis, Institute of Financial Management, Alpen-Adria-
University Klagenfurt 
Michael Loretz, Roland Mestel, and Stefan Palan, Institute of Banking 
and Finance, Karl-Franzens-University Graz 
 
Summary 
Uncertainty about long-term climate policy is a major driving force in the evolution of the 
carbon market price. Since this price enters the investment decision process of regulated 
firms, this uncertainty increases the cost of capital for investors and might deter invest-
ments into new technologies at the company level. We apply a real options-based approach 
to assess the impact of climate change policy in the form of a constant or growing price 
floor on investment decisions of a single firm in a competitive environment. This firm has the 
opportunity to switch from a high-carbon “dirty” technology to a low-carbon “clean” 
technology. Using Monte Carlo simulation and dynamic programming techniques for real 
market data, we determine the optimal CO2 price floor level and growth rate in order to 
induce investments into the low-carbon technology. We show these findings to be robust to 
a large variety of input parameter settings. 
 
Keywords: Carbon price, price floor, technological change, investment decision, real option 
approach 
 
JEL Classification: D81, O38, Q55 
 
We thank Barbara Buchner, Vera Hofer, Hans Kellerer, Michael Kopel and the participants of the 








Address for correspondence: 
 
Alexander Brauneis 
Institute of Financial Management 
Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt 
Universitaetsstrasse 65-67 
9020 Klagenfurt  
Austria 
E-mail: alexander.brauneis@aau.at Inducing Low-Carbon Investment in the Electric Power Industry 










Uncertainty about long-term climate policy is a major driving force in the evolution of the 
carbon market price. Since this price enters the investment decision process of regulated 
firms, this uncertainty increases the cost of capital for investors and might deter invest-
ments into new technologies at the company level. We apply a real options-based ap-
proach to assess the impact of climate change policy in the form of a constant or growing 
price floor on investment decisions of a single firm in a competitive environment. This firm 
has the opportunity to switch from a high-carbon “dirty” technology to a low-carbon “clean” 
technology. Using Monte Carlo simulation and dynamic programming techniques for real 
market data, we determine the optimal CO2 price floor level and growth rate in order to 
induce investments into the low-carbon technology. We show these findings to be robust 
to a large variety of input parameter settings. 
 
Keywords:  Carbon price, price floor, technological change, investment decision, real 
option approach. 
JEL codes:  D81, O38, Q55. 
a Institute of Financial Management, Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt, Universitaetsstrasse 65-67, 9020 
Klagenfurt, AUSTRIA 
b Institute of Banking and Finance, Karl-Franzens-University Graz, Universitaetsstrasse 15/F2, 8010 Graz, 
AUSTRIA 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Barbara Buchner, Vera Hofer, Hans Kellerer, Michael Kopel and the participants of the first Graz 
Carbon Workshop 2010 for valuable comments. All errors are our own.    
2 
1. Introduction 
In the context of reducing long-term carbon price uncertainty stemming from ambiguous 
climate change policy, some contributions in the academic literature have suggested sev-
eral forms of regulatory price management, mainly in the form of a price cap or safety 
valve
1  (Pizer (2002);  Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) ;  Szolgayová, Fuss, and Obers teiner 
(2008)).
2 If realized abatement costs turn out to be higher than expected (i.e. the emission 
cap is too low) the price cap serves as a ceiling on the carbon price and emitters can buy 
additional permits at the specified price
3. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002), Helm (2008), 
Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn (2010), Fell and Morgenstern (2009), and Philibert  extend this 
discussion by analyzing a “symmetric safety valve”, also referred to as a price collar. This 
approach not only insures emitters against higher than expected costs, but also sets a 
minimum carbon price, thereby bounding compliance costs downward. Experience from 
the EU ETS, the world’s largest multi-national carbon trading scheme, provides evidence 
for the thought that an overestimation of abatement costs might be a more realistic scenar-
io than an underestimation. Therefore, a price floor might be a more critical design element 
within a fixed price range than a cap. 
A price floor reduces uncertainty over future profitability by guaranteeing a minimum rate 
of return to an investor or firm pondering an investment decision. This argument is particu-
larly important in the energy sector, which is characterized by capital-intensive low-carbon 
technologies and long-lived power plants. In this sense a minimum carbon price creates 
incentives to invest in new technologies over and above those already  induced by the 
(unmanaged) market price. Abatement will still take place if the costs of CO2-reductions 
are lower than the price of allowances, since profit-maximizing firms will implement the 
emissions reductions and sell the surplus allowances. A second argument in favor of the 
implementation of a price floor is the possibility that it would limit the volatility of carbon 
market prices (Grüll and Taschini (2011)). In times of growing volatility in fuel prices this 
fact would favor renewable energy. 
                                            
1 The idea of combining price (tax) and quantity (allowances) instruments, usually referred to as a hybrid 
system, was initially suggested by (Roberts and Spence (1976)). 
2 Alternative ways to reduce climate policy uncertainties are mentioned in (Lambie (2010)). 
3 (Murray, Newell, and Pizer (2008)) extend the concept of a price ceiling with an unlimited volume of extra 
permits by the idea of an allowance reserve that caps this volume.  
3 
An intensive academic discussion about such a downside insurance in carbon markets 
started only recently with the work of Wood and Jotzo (2011). This is surprising given that 
the concept of a price floor has already found its way into legislation in the United Kingdom 
and Australia (HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs (2010); Australian Government 
(2011)). In the case of the UK the floor is one of several measures for encouraging low-
carbon energy investments (Department of Energy & Climate Change (2011)). Commenc-
ing on 1 April 2013 at around 15.70 GBP/ton CO2, following a straight line to 30 GBP/ton in 
2020 and targeting 70 GBP/ton in 2030, the UK price floor is designed to top up the carbon 
price of the EU ETS – which the UK is a member of – to a national target level. Since other 
countries under the EU ETS do not have a similar price floor, this measure will increase 
abatement costs in the UK relative to other EU countries. UK legislators justify this higher 
burden by arguing that regulatory uncertainty about future carbon prices may undermine 
long-term price signals and incentives and that the carbon price from the EU ETS might 
not be strong and stable enough to stimulate sufficient investments in low-carbon technol-
ogies.
4 The Commission implicitly agrees  to this diagnosis when stating  that, in order to 
boost low-carbon technologies, “[…] appropriate measures need to be considered, includ-
ing revisiting the agreed linear reduction of the ETS cap” (European Commission (2011)). 
In this sense an additional goal evolves from a cap-and-trade system: it could be used to 
promote technological innovation to a greater extent than automatically induced by the 
long-term price signals from the market. 
Taking this logic as our starting point, we contribute to this debate about price manage-
ment in the form of a floor price in the carbon market. Setting aside organizational ques-
tions concerning the implementation of the floor (for these we refer to Wood and Jotzo 
(2011)) we focus on how investment decisions in the electric power sector are affected by 
the introduction of a permit price floor. We employ a real options model of an individual 
electricity producer who currently operates a “dirty” power generation technology, which 
we define as a technology that has considerably higher CO2 emissions per production unit 
than alternative technologies. This implies that the firm has comparatively large compli-
ance costs. The company furthermore faces an investment decision which would permit it 
to switch to a “clean” generation technology, i.e. a technology with low emissions per pro-
duction unit. By simulating sets of cashflow paths as functions of technology specific cost 
                                            
4 (Grubb and Neuhoff (2006)) argue that uncertainty concerning expected permit prices is a major reason for 
firms to delay investment under the EU ETS.  
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related to construction, fuel and carbon emissions, we show that a regulatory intervention 
in the form of a price management mechanism in the CO2-market influences the optimal 
timing of the investment decision of this company. In particular, we demonstrate that the 
introduction of a price floor can lead to an earlier adoption of low-carbon technologies. In 
this case, the CO2-market acts as an instrument for technology policy. 
The methodology we apply is similar to that in several contributions dealing with invest-
ment decisions in the power sector under different dimensions of uncertainties. Compara-
ble studies, among others, are Laurikka and Koljonen (2006), Fuss et al. (2008), Szolgay-
ová, Fuss, and Obersteiner (2008), Yang et al. (2008), Fuss et al. (2009), Fuss and Szol-
gayová (2010), Chen and Tseng (2011), Kettunen, Bunn, and Blyth (2011) and Zhu and 
Fan (2011). However, none of the aforementioned contributions evaluate the influence of a 
carbon price floor on the investment decision in general and the timing of the technology 
switch specifically. The only study employing, at least in passing, a price floor in a quanti-
tative model is Abadie, Chamorro, and González-Eguino (2011). In contrast to their work, 
we do not only perform a detailed analysis of a constant floor price level but investigate 
different designs of the floor. In particular, we perform an in-depth investigation of a price 
floor mechanism with linearly increasing minimum prices. In addition, we endogenously 
compute the floor price necessary to trigger abandonment of the “dirty” technology at an 
earlier time. Finally, we perform a number of robustness checks using a large variety of 
different input parameter settings. These tests qualitatively substantiate our main finding of 
the existence of a trigger minimum price design. 
In what follows, chapter 2 presents the model we use to analyze the influence of a price 
floor on a firm’s optimal investment decision. Chapter 3 contains results from Monte Carlo 
simulations and backward dynamic programming as well as robustness checks. Chapter 4 
concludes. 
2. The model 
We model a single power generating firm which is a price taker in all markets and supplies 
electricity inelastically. The firm has to comply with an emissions trading system by obtain-
ing emissions permits covering its production needs. We assume it to buy and redeem the 
necessary carbon certificates at the end of each period. This ensures that the company 
never holds any surplus certificates which it would wish to sell back to the market.  
5 
2.1. Structure of the decision problem 
The firm currently operates a “dirty” technology ( ) power plant with a remaining life of    
. 
This technology is characterized by high emissions per production unit, causing the firm to 
face high costs of compliance with the emissions trading system.
5 The company has to 
make a decision about replacing the  currently operating power plant before the end of its 
economic life. In particular, the firm can choose one of  three courses of action at the be-
ginning of each period, modeled in discrete time : (i) discontinuing business, (ii) replacing 
the existing power plant with a new power plant using the same technology   , or (iii) re-
placing the existing power plant with a new power plant using a “clean” technology ( ), 
which is characterized by low emissions per production unit.
6 
If the firm chooses option (i), we assume that the disinvestment is associated with  costs 
(disassembly of the power plant, termination of contracts, etc.) and revenues (sale of the 
old power plant and/or the land it is built on) which sum to zero, with cash flows of zero in 
every period thereafter.
7 If it chooses options (ii) or (iii), it faces a technology dependent 
investment cost of     , where   {   }. The investment cost is distributed uniformly over 
the construction time of   . During the construction time, the current plant is assumed to 
continue operating, yielding cash flows of    
  every period. After construction is finished, 
the old power plant is closed down with net revenues and costs of zero and the new power 
plant starts yielding cash flows of    
  for every period of its life of   .
8 Note that, while de-
cisions are always made at the beginning of a period, cash flows are assumed to accrue at 
its end. 
Except for the case where  the firm decides to (irreversibly) discontinue business,  we re-
quire it to have exactly one power plant under operation at all times , i.e. there may be no 
gap between the end of the life of the current power plant and the end of the construction 
time of a new power plant, and the old and a new power plant may not be operated simu l-
                                            
5 The exact parameters for our numerical analysis will be provided in section 3. 
6 (Fuss and Szolgayová (2010)) conduct a similar analysis investigating the decision to switc h from a coal-
fired power plant to a wind farm. However, they focus on the role of uncertainty associated with the techn o-
logical progress of green technologies and do not account for a carbon price floor. 
7 Note that we regard the replacement decision for this one power plant in isolation and disregard any effects 
it might have on other activities of the firm. 
8 We model the dirty technology   as being static, meaning that a new dirty power plant’s cash flows follow 
the same stochastic process as the current dirty power plant’s.  
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taneously. Since the object of our analysis is the replacement decision for the currently 
operating plant, we can thus set 
       
     
 
[  ]  (1) 
and refer to [   ] as the investment decision horizon. This is the time interval over which 
the firm has the opportunity to freely choose between all three options. If it waited longer 
than  , it could no longer choose freely between technologies   and   if it wanted to meet 
the requirement to have a plant under operation at all times. We require the company’s 
decision to be irreversible for the model horizon. In other words, if the company decides to 
build a new plant of technology  , it will then operate this plant (and this technology) until 
after the end of the model horizon             [  ]. If the firm decides to discontinue this 
line of its business, it will never re-enter it. 
Our question concerning the introduction of a price floor in the carbon market is threefold: 
firstly, we are interested in whether the dirty plant is replaced or not. If this is the case, we 
secondly investigate which technology is chosen. Thirdly, we want to determine at which 
point in time    – if ever– the “dirty” plant is optimally replaced by the “clean” one. 
2.2. Stochastic price processes 
We assume the CO2 price to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) as in Szolgayo-
vá, Fuss, and Obersteiner (2008) und Yang et al. (2008).
9 The CO2 price   is therefore 
modeled as having two components – an expected drift and a random walk: 
                    (2) 
                                            
9 Note that we choose GBM processes for the ease of modeling and because the specific form of stochastic 
process is not the focus of our analysis. It is however quite possible to introduce other stochastic processes 
into the model. As will become clear later on, the use of processes generating non-normally distributed out-
comes requires adjusted techniques for assessing the timing of the investment decision. Specifically, we 
currently use ordinary least squares regression to estimate  expected values. This simple and robust ap-
proach would have to be modified by employing more advanced regression techniques. With regard to the 
type of process specifications to use, we consider models including regime switches and jumps in the price 
paths to be particularly promising candidates for future work. They have attained increased relevance in light 
of the recent discussion about the use of nuclear power and alternative technologies, as well as the large 
impact of environmental policy decisions, both of which carry the potential to instantly and strongly affect the 
circumstances on carbon markets.  
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where    is the drift rate,     denotes the standard deviation, and    is a standard Wiener 
process. We use the same underlying process, albeit with different parameters, to model 
the price our firm receives for selling electricity,   , and to model its technology specific 
variable costs (operating, maintenance and fuel costs),    . Each realization of these pro-
cesses is discretized, departs from a fixed value at time      , and is being simulated for 
the entire model horizon  . We assume the individual processes to be uncorrelated in the 
larger part of the subsequent analysis, but report results obtained with correlated process-
es in section 3.4. 
2.3. Dynamic programming 
Our derivation of the optimal decision in this context is loosely based on the approach of 
Longstaff  and  Schwartz  (2001),  which brings together backward oriented dynamic pro-
gramming techniques and forward oriented simulation techniques, and is thus a versatile 
procedure which allows for handling multivariate state variables (see Gamba and Fusari 
(2009)). The key insight of Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) was that the conditional value 
(expectation) of future payments can be estimated from the cross-sectional information in 
the simulation by using a least squares approach.
10 
Consider Figure 1 showing the time structure of the model. At the beginning of every peri-
od in the interval [   ], the firm can choose to either continue producing using its current 
power plant, to irreversibly switch to the technology   by building a new power plant, or to 
discontinue business altogether. 
                                            
10 The instrument modeled by (Longstaff and Schwartz (2001)), an American Call option, has the character-
istics that (i) the underlying does not pay any dividends, and (ii) there are only two alternative courses of 
action at each node - to exercise or not to exercise. In our example, the investments generate cash flows in 
every period and we face the three-fold decision problem of continuing production with the current technolo-
gy, investing in the new technology, or exiting the business altogether.  
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Figure 1: Model time structure 
Our optimization procedure starts with a Monte Carlo simulation, which is used to generate 
paths for the relevant state variables. Based on these simulated paths, the dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm compares the expected outcome of investing in a new technology   
plant with delaying the investment for one more period, and with the possibility of exiting 
the business immediately. Note that, in our solution algorithm, we do not allow for rein-
vestment in technology   at any time      . Given a positive discount rate, such a strategy 
would always be suboptimal. A new plant of technology   generates the same cash flows 
as the existing plant, yet requires payment of the investment cost. For this reason, if an 
optimal solution entails reinvesting in technology   , this decision can only be made at 
       
    . We therefore do not consider premature reinvestment in   in our numerical 
solution algorithm. 
The optimal exercise decision at any point in time is obtained as the maximum of the im-
mediate investment value, the expected value from delaying the decision, and zero in case 
of disinvestment. Since the expected continuation value depends on future outcomes, the 
procedure must work backwards from the latest (     ) to the earliest possible investment 
time (     ) (Cortazar, Gravet, and Urzua (2008)). Following this procedure we obtain, for 
each path, the optimal decision. This can be to discontinue business at any time   [   ], to 
reinvest in technology   at time        
    , or to invest in the clean technology at any 
time   [   ]. 
Operationally, the procedures of the dynamic programming approach differ between time 
      and any      . The following sections provide the algorithm we follow to solve the 
dynamic programming problem. 
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2.3.1. Determination of the decision at       
We start by calculating the net present value of a plant investment at       for each simu-
lated path: 
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where   [     ] is the index of the specific simulated path under consideration, and  (   ) 
denotes the discount factor applied at time   to cash flows occurring at time  . Further-
more, the cash flow      
  is defined as: 
     
    (            
         
   
    
   )   (     )  
    
      
where      is the revenue (calculated as the electricity output in MWh times the price for 
electricity      ) at time   on the simulated path  ,      
   are the variable costs (calculated as 
the electricity output in MWh times the technology dependent variable cost factor) for each 
of the two technologies,      
   are the carbon costs (calculated as the CO2 output in tons 
times the price of carbon certificates     ),         ⁄  is the depreciation for the power plant, 
and   is the corporate tax rate. 
In order to maintain comparability, irrespective of the specific time at which the clean in-
vestment is realized, we consistently  evaluate all investment programs over our model 
horizon of   periods. Equation (3) rests on the simplifying assumption that the plant will be 
sold for its remaining book value at the end of this time.
11 The net present value from 
equation (3) thus is the sum of four terms: (a) the cash flows from the (existing) technology 
  plant during the construction time of the new (  or  ) plant; (b) the discounted (negative) 
investment outlay for the new plant, distributed linearly over the construction time; (c) the 
discounted sum of the cash flows from the plant over the time interval from the end of its 
                                            
11 Note that in section 3 we choose   to be sufficiently long that alternative treatments of the residual plant 
value have a negligible impact on the optimal decision.  
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construction until the end of the model horizon  ; and (d) the discounted revenue from 
selling the plant for its book value at      . 
Because present values coming from simulated cash flow paths themselves are uncertain, 
we need to form an expectation of these values. We achieve this by regressing the net 
present values obtained under (3) on a linear combination of a set of basis functions of the 
simulated state variables at time      , using a simple least-squares specification (Gamba 
and Fusari (2009) and Longstaff and Schwartz (2001)): 
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    (     
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(4) 
where   
  is a constant, the     
  are regression coefficients,      is the carbon price at time   
on the simulated path  , and     
   is a white random error term. 
We then use the regression parameters we obtain to calculate the estimated net present 
value for each simulated path at time      : 
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where   [ ] is the expectation operator, applied at time  . 
In the next step, we decide between exiting the business, reinvesting in technology  , and 
investing in technology  . We thus obtain the following expected net present value condi-
tional on optimal investment behavior: 
  [      
   |          
       
       ]
     [    [      
 |          
      ]   [      
 |          
       ]] 
(6)  
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2.3.2. Determination of the decision at       
The conditional expected net present value obtained in the previous section forms the ba-
sis for the analysis at          . Here we distinguish between the treatment of the case 
where (i) we invest in the clean technology and (ii) we continue production using the dirty 
technology. 
In case (i), we again calculate each path’s net present value of investing in the clean tech-
nology using equation (3). We then use these to estimate the regression according to 
equation (4) and calculate the vector of   expected net present values when investing in 
the clean technology using equation (5). 
For case (ii) we use the values obtained from equation (6) for      , add the cash flow for 
period          , which accrues at the end of the period, and estimate the following re-
gression for          : 
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(7) 
We  then  calculate  the  estimated  net  present  value  for  each  simulated  path  at  time 
           using equation (5) with the coefficient estimates obtained from equation (7) to 
obtain the expected net present values   [      
 |          
       ]. Finally, we obtain the ex-
pected net present value conditional on optimal investment behavior at           by apply-
ing equation (6). The arguments of the maximum function in (6) now are the expected net 
present values from cases (i) and (ii), and zero. 
By repeating the steps undertaken for           for all other times   [               ], we 
derive the net present value conditional on optimal investment behavior for the entire in-
vestment decision horizon. The result along each simulation path is then the time of the 
(temporally) first case where the decision is other than to continue operating the dirty tech-
nology plant. In other words, starting at time       and progressing forward through time, 
we record for each path the earliest point in time where the optimal decision is to either 
invest into technology   or to exit the business altogether.  
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3. Numerical Results 
This section presents results from example calculations using our methodology. While the 
procedures can be applied to any decision regarding the timing of the switch to a low-
emissions technology, for our numerical examples we compare a coal fired “dirty” plant to 
a hydro powered “clean” plant. The following parameters characterizing the investment 
decision are geared to real market data, with the revenues and costs associated with the 
clean  and  dirty  technologies  being  taken  from  findings  of  the  European  Commission’s 
Strategic Energy Review (EC Energy Review 2008). Specifically, we assume that a power 
company  currently  operates  a  technology     plant  with  an  installed  capacity  of  1MW, 
             mio EUR (1265 EUR/kW), and    
     years. The construction time in the 
case  of  reinvestment  in  technology     is          years  and  the  new  plant  has  a  life  of 
       . The technology   plant is characterized by         years and        years. Fol-
lowing equation (1) this implies that        and that the existing plant needs to be re-
placed at a yet to be determined optimal time      {          }. We also consider a rein-
vestment in the currently operated technology    which implies a lead time of 3 years. 
However, since this decision is, if ever, taken only at        (3 years prior to the end of the 
existing coal plant’s economic life) and thus lies outside our analysis’ time interval of inter-
est, we do not explicitly report detailed results on that aspect.
12 
Assuming an average load capacity of 85%,  a  coal  plant’s  annual  output  is  1 MW · 
8760 h · 0.85 = 7446 MWh. Due to a lower annual load ratio of 50%, a hydro plant with the 
same output requires an installed capacity of 1.7 MW at a cost of 1800 EUR/kW. Hence, 
the alternative requires an investment of              mio EUR. We furthermore assume 
initial unit costs of 0.0164 EUR/kWh for the coal plant and 0.0074 EUR/kWh for the hydro 
plant. CO2 emissions are set to 820 g/kWh and 6 g/kWh, respectively. Irrespective of the 
type of operated plant, we use an initial market price for power of 0.08 EUR/kWh in our 
analysis. The discount rate is chosen to be       . Finally, we assume linear depreciation 
and a corporate tax rate of 50%. 
                                            
12 Note that we do not report detailed results for the case where the firm decides to reinvest in technology  . 
This decision is, if ever, only taken at        
         , after a decision at            not to invest in a new 
technology   plant. This case is of limited interest to our analysis since we focus on the question of whether 
and when investment in   takes place.  
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Completing our basic parameter setting, we arbitrarily assume the revenues and the unit 
costs to have drift and diffusion rates of 1%, respectively, with one exception. The unit cost 
process of the coal plant is modeled as having a diffusion rate of           because of 
more volatile coal prices included in the total cost. The price process of CO2 emission al-
lowances is assumed to have a drift rate of         and a diffusion rate of         , 
which on the one hand reflects consent price forecasts (e.g. a price of 30 EUR per ton CO2 
in 2020) and on the other hand historical CO2 return volatility. The price processes start 
with the following initial values: 
Parameter  Value 
       7446000 kWh · 0.0800 EUR/kWh = 595680 EUR 
     
     7446000 kWh · 0.0164 EUR/kWh = 122114 EUR 
     
     7446000 kWh · 0.0074 EUR/kWh = 55100 EUR 
     15 EUR/ton 
     
     0.82 ton/MWh · 7446 MWh · 15 EUR = 91586 EUR 
     
     0.006 ton/MWh · 7446 MWh · 15 EUR = 670 EUR  
Table 1: Initial values for the simulation 
We set our total  model horizon     to  be  40 years.  Since  we model our  parameters to 
roughly correspond to the situation in the EU in 2010, this corresponds to a horizon until 
2050, which is the latest date for which useful emission quantity forecasts are available 
(See  European  Commission  (2011)). We  then  run  10000  simulations  for  all  stochastic 
components and derive an optimal point in time    for replacing technology   with   by 
applying the algorithm as described in section 2.3. 
3.1. An illustrative example 
For the ease of understanding of our methodology, we present a brief numerical example 
in this section. We simulate ten cash flow paths with a total of 40 cash flows each, with all 
parameters taken from above. Figure 2 plots the ten cash flow time series for technology   
and   plants:  
14 
 
Figure 2: Example price paths. Deviating from the baseline parameter setting, these cash flow paths 
use a diffusion rate of 10% for the CO2 price process, eliminating extreme price paths due to high 
volatility and making the plot easier to read. 
Due to our use of a fairly high CO2 allowance price drift rate of        , the cash flows 
coming from operating technology   turn negative very quickly, whereas those from   are 
less exposed to high carbon prices and thus exhibit a positive slope, resulting in positive 
NPVs. Since no “dirty” cash flow path exhibits an NPV greater than the corresponding 
“clean” one, all subsequent calculations for time        are restricted to the technology   
cash flows. The individual “clean” NPVs and the expected NPVs from the regression ap-
proach, respectively, are: 
        
     2718  2639  3285  2266  2129  2444  2598  2508  2961  1907 
   [        
  |            
        ]   2748  2882  2887  2479  2120  2411  2490  2612  2972  1854 
Table 2: Expected net present values and net present values from an immediate investment in the 
clean technology at        (thousand EUR). 
The parameter estimates from the quadratic regression as outlined in section 2.3 yield 
 ̂  
              ̂
    
           ̂
     
             ̂
     
           ̂
     
            ̂
      
   
      ̂
      
       . Due to the very low number of simulation paths, the signs of these esti- 
15 
mates partly appear counterintuitive (in particular the estimate    ̂
    
  , derived from the data 
in Table 3). However, with our standard number of 10000 state variable paths, the pa-
rameter of the linear revenue term exhibits a positive, and all linear cost related variables 
negative signs. The signs of the quadratic term parameters are more difficult to interpret, 
yet this is of limited importance since these terms are included only as controls. 
Since all expected NPVs are positive, at        investment in   is undertaken in all simula-
tion runs. So far our methodology thus suggests        as the optimal switching time in 
every path. Working backwards in time, at       we again first calculate the net present 
values for all cash flow time series and subsequently estimate the “clean” NPVs based on 
the level of the state variables at      . The results from applying the regression approach 
can be seen in Table 3. 
      
     2751  2677  3288  2309  2136  2505  2665  2550  3004  1953 
  [      
  |          
       ]   2887  2913  2934  2485  2207  2493  2586  2504  2960  1868 
Table 3: Expected net present values and net present values from an immediate investment in the 
clean technology at       (thousand EUR). 
The  corresponding  estimated  regression  parameters  are:   ̂ 
              ̂
   
   
       ̂
    
           ̂
    
           ̂
    
            ̂
     
           ̂
     
     . 
At this stage, standard discounted cash flow analysis would yield a recommendation for 
immediate investment since all expected NPVs are positive. However, it may be a superior 
strategy to delay the investment to the point in time which has so far been identified to be 
optimal, namely       . The corresponding expected NPVs of the next period’s optimal 
decision are therefore the expected NPVs presented in Table 4. 
The decision between an immediate investment and a deferment now requires a reference 
value, which can be obtained from equation (7). For each path, we then again  use all 
available state variables as independent variables and the expected NPV stemming from 
the following period’s optimal behavior plus the cash flow from technology   for the current 
period as the dependent variable. Note that contrary to the regression at       , at all ear-
lier points in time we use both the   and   cost values, since there is also the possibility of 
a further deferment in the period after the next. This implies possible dependencies of next 
period’s expected optimal NPV on the current cost level of the existing ( ) plant. The re-
gression  at         yields  the  following  parameter  estimates:   ̂ 
                ̂
   
      
16 
       ̂
     
              ̂
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             ̂
    
             ̂
(   )
 
  
            ̂
(   )
 
  
     
     ̂
     
         . They in turn resulting in the following expected optimal NPVs at      : 
  [      
   |          
        ]  2808  2956  2927  2543  2131  2429  2545  2631  3023  1882 
Table 4: Expected continuation values at       (thousand EUR). 
The expected continuation values are greater than the expected payoffs from an immedi-
ate investment in paths     {          }, which makes it the optimal decision at       in the-
se paths to defer the investment in  . Moreover these results cause the vector of updated 
expected optimal NPVs at       to equal   [      
   ] for these paths, and to equal the dis-
counted values of    [        
   ] for the remaining paths. Hence, for the next step of our 
methodology at      , this information is used to determine   [      
   ]. 
Continuing like this until       yields a vector of optimal switching times   
  for all simulated 
price paths. This allows us to draw a simulation-based inference regarding the optimal 
time at which technology   should be realized. 
3.2. Results without a CO2 emission price floor 
We start the analysis proper by determining the optimal time    for the replacement of 
technology   with   in the case where the price of CO2 emission allowances is not regu-
lated. Table 5 shows the results from 10000 simulations without a CO2 price floor. 
     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
#switches  0  43  297  447  465  476  452  562  807  6451 
Table 5: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time   . The optimal 
strategy results in technology   being replaced by   in all paths. 
In the overwhelming majority of paths we find the optimal strategy to consist of investing in 
a   plant at       . In the case of no CO2 price regulation, simulations thus essentially  
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suggest the end of the investment decision horizon as the optimal time to switch from 
technology   to  .
13 
3.3. Results with a CO2 emission price floor 
In this section we examine the effect on the distribution of optimal replacement times of 
introducing a minimum price      for CO2 emission allowances, set by regulatory institu-
tions. As noted in section 2.2, the price floor is implemented by having the CO2 price follow 
a GBM. However, if the market price trajectory falls below     , the price used for the cost 
calculations is instead set to      until the GBM appreciates again to a price higher than 
    . Setting      equal to 30 EUR/ton yields the data depicted in Table 6. It displays, for 
each point in time     {      }, the number of simulations yielding this time as the optimal 
investment date. 
     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
#switches   3  170  435  864  646  598  714  876  932  4762 
Table 6: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time    when       
   EUR/ton. Again Technology   is replaced by   in all paths. 
Increasing     
 from 30 to 40 and 45 EUR/ton respectively, changes the distribution of the 
optimal time of exercise as follows: 
           1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
40  #switches  516  1419  1053  805  655  503  518  520  795  3216 
45  #switches  7074  754  356  193  160  76  131  128  183  945 
Table 7: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time    when       
      EUR/ton. Technology   is replaced by   in all paths. 
We interpret these results as evidence of a very sensitive relation between      and   . 
Apparently,    does not shift smoothly from the future to earlier points in time as      in-
creases. Instead, there seems to be a critical level of      at which    shifts quickly from 
the latest to the earliest possible investment date. In our setup, we find the level of     
 
which shifts the majority of paths’   
  from   
       to   
      to be around 42.50 EUR/ton. 
                                            
13 Increasing the carbon price by means of a higher drift rate in formula (2) leads to earlier optimal switching 
times. This result corroborates the findings of (Szolgayová, Fuss, and Obersteiner (2008)).  
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Obviously, the methodology chosen is characterized by a pronounced binary pattern in   . 
This is due to the regression approach used in the estimation of the present values of the 
uncertain future cash flow time series. It removes the greatest part of the variation in the 
price paths by basing decisions on expected values. 
Figure 3 plots the distribution of optimal switching times    over different values of     . As 
long as           EUR/ton our simulations indicate the optimal switching time to be domi-
nated by        . When      increases further, the optimal switching time quickly shifts 
from           to        .  Also,  all  other  possible  investment  decision  dates  (         
         ) are of minor importance. This graphically substantiates the proposition of a 
binary pattern within the investment decision. The intersection of the        and         
trajectories can be found around             . This floor price level can be interpreted as 
the geometric solution to the question of the critical      which triggers    to shift from 10 
to 1. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of optimal switching time    over different minimum prices for CO2 
In reality it seems unlikely that any regulator will be able to directly implement a minimum 
price of triple the current market price. For this reason we analyze the effects of a different  
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price floor mechanism. In this second approach, we set the starting floor price   
    to a 
value close to the current market price and increase it by an increment   in every period 
thereafter.
14 If the initial minimum price   
    is for example set to 15 and the increment is 
chosen to be      , the next period’s minimum CO2 prices will be 16, then 17,and so on. 
Contrary to a fixed level of   
           this approach does not result in a distribution of 
optimal switching times peaking at        or        , but rather concentrates the optimal 
switching decision to a time in the interior of [      ] (especially when the diffusion rate 
   of the CO2 price process is low). The modal outcome of    depends on the choice of  . 
Table 8 shows results from simulation runs where   
         and all other parameters are 
set according to our basic scenario: 
 
       1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1  #switches  0  102  465  648  666  600  722  747  1088  4962 
2  #switches  4  296  716  834  849  864  758  868  1159  3652 
2.5  #switches  2  387  912  1160  1209  954  896  740  971  2769 
3  #switches  2  533  1462  1779  1500  1239  955  610  443  1477 
4  #switches  88  2116  3757  2887  1105  19  17  0  8  3 
5  #switches  1042  5960  2893  105  0  0  0  0  0  0 
6  #switches  7742  2252  6  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
7  #switches  9977  23  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Table 8: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time    when   
     
   EUR/ton and an increment of     {                 }. The higher the increment, the earlier the 
replacement investment comes to be realized. Our results indicate the requirement of       EUR per 
year for the mode of optimal switching times to occur earlier than at       . 
Figure 4 presents the fraction of optimal switching times for different   
    when   is set to 
3 EUR/ton. If a minimum price for CO2 is combined with a constant annual increase of this 
minimum price, optimal switching times are – over large parts of the parameter space – 
again dominated by two points in time, namely        and        . However, when   
    
falls in the interval between 20 and 33 EUR/ton, other points in time can be observed to 
                                            
14 Note that this is a generalization of our approach in that our previous analysis is a special case where 
  
           and      .  
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exhibit peaks and thus constitute the predominant times at which the clean plant should be 
built. 
 
Figure 4: Fraction of optimal switching times    with respect to different   
    when      . 
3.4. Discussion and Robustness Checks 
As pointed out in the preceding section, the choice of input parameters is crucial for the 
results regarding the optimal switching time   . Since some of our parameter settings re-
sult in very different optimal switching times for only slightly modified parameters we now 
assess the robustness of our results by running simulations with a large set of parameter 
setting variations. Our main interest lies in the effects of changes in 
  the initial minimum CO2 price   
    
  the chosen increment   
  the drift rate   , and 
  the diffusion rate    of the CO2 price process, as well as 
  the discount rate  .  
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More  precisely,  we  jointly  vary  our  parameters  over  the  following  values:    
     
{            },      {       },       {            },       {             }  and     
{                }, yielding a total of 21 · 6 · 6 · 5 · 5 = 18900 combinations of different 
input parameter choices and requiring the simulation of 3x10
10 individual values. All other 
parameters are held constant, because they only concern revenues and technology relat-
ed costs and lifetimes and are thus considered to be relatively reliable. The following fig-
ures plot results from the majority of the 18900 parameter settings. In the interest of clarity 
we only report the decision time which maximizes the fraction of our 10000 paths in which 
the switch to technology   occurs at this time (mode). This is done graphically in Figures 5 
through 7. White areas indicate that    predominantly equals 10, whereas black areas la-
bel cases where the modal outcome is       . Other optimal points in time are shaded 
gray. We do this separately for three different discount rates, namely     {              }, 
drift rates (rows of the plot matrix), and diffusion rates (columns of the plot matrix). This 
yields 30 subplots per figure. In each subplot, the abscissa shows the different increments 
    {       }  and  the  ordinate  labels  the  different  initial  minimum  CO2  prices,    
     
{            }. 
 
Figure 5: Most frequently chosen times for switching from technology   to   when       . Black 
indicates that the modal outcome from 10000 simulation runs is       and white indicates it to be 
      .  
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Figure 6: Most frequently chosen times for switching from technology   to   when       . Black 
indicates that the modal outcome from 10000 simulation runs is       and white indicates it to be 
      . 
In the case of        (Figure 5), low drift rates and high diffusion rates yield later optimal 
switching times, while       is more often found to be the optimal time to switch from tech-
nology   to   if the drift rate is high and the diffusion rate of the CO2 price process is low. 
As Figures 6 and 7 show,    shifts to later points in time with increases in the discount rate. 
If we increase the latter to 0.07, almost all parameter settings result in a deferment of the 
investment into technology   to the end of the investment decision horizon at        (with 
the exception of those cases where   
    and   are relatively high).  
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Figure 7: Most frequently chosen times for switching from technology   to   when       . Black 
indicates that the modal outcome from 10000 simulation runs is       and white indicates it to be 
      . 
Taken together, we find a clear pattern in these plots. For each combination of the dis-
count, the drift and the diffusion rates there exists a pair of   
    and   which moves the 
optimal time for replacing technology   with   from        to      . This provides a clear 
argument for CO2 price policy in the form of a price floor. 
We also briefly assess the effects of different levels of input parameters employing a ceter-
is paribus analysis. The following figures depict the distribution of    for 10000 simulation 
runs, varying one of the input parameters of interest and keeping all other parameters 
constant. By default, we set   
         EUR/ton,      ,        ,          and       . 
We vary the latter four separately to reveal the effects different levels of these parameters 
have on the investment decision.  
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Figure 8: The left hand plot depicts effects of different levels of the increment  , the right hand plot 
sketches the impact of different drift rates    of the CO2 price process.   
    is set to 30 EUR/ton. 
 
Figure 9: The left hand plot shows the effect of different diffusion rates    on the optimal switching 
time. On the right, effects of different discount rates   on the investment timing problem are shown. 
Again,   
    equals 30 EUR/ton.  
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Note  that,  for  the  given  parameter  setting,  the  mode  of  the  optimal  switching  time  is 
        for any volatility of the CO2 price process. Furthermore, the fraction of cases where 
        is the optimal switching time is highest for very low and very high diffusion rates. 
This is a departure from the findings for the other parameters, which exhibit a monoto-
nously increasing or decreasing pattern for the fractions of optimal switching times        
and        . Since this “volatility smile” could also have been the result of a too low num-
ber of simulation runs, we replicated this effect with 100000 simulations,  obtaining the 
same result. This pattern can be attributed to the fact that higher volatility of the CO2 price 
implies a greater number of very high carbon price scenarios as well as very low price 
scenarios. A greater number of high CO2 price paths do not affect the investment decision, 
since as soon as the CO2 price exceeds a critical threshold, an early investment into tech-
nology   is optimal in any case. However, since lower prices also become more frequent, 
this benefits the dirty technology and results in the observed pattern of deferred switching 
times. Furthermore the discount rate plays a prominent role, since there is great variability 
in optimal switching times in a narrow bandwidth of discount rates. This shows that the 
investment timing decision to a large degree depends on the capital costs of the firm. 
Another aspect of our setup that we check for robustness are the uncorrelated processes 
of state variables (revenues, unit costs using technologies   and  , CO2 costs). We tackle 
this point by introducing a (largely) non-zero correlation matrix of the form: 
    [
             
             
           
           
] 
We assume that revenues are positively linked to costs, since any power producer will try 
to pass increased costs on to consumers. Nonetheless, the correlations are chosen with 
the main aim of capturing what possible effect the use of correlated state variables could 
have, without trying to exactly mirror real world correlation structures. We chart the effects 
we find as the difference in the fractions of optimal switching times between a simulation 
using uncorrelated state variables and one employing correlated state variables.  
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Figure 10: Differences in the fraction of optimal switching times. The plot shows changes from the 
uncorrelated setup when introducing correlation between the state variable processes. 
Figure 10 shows that the optimal switching times from        to        are hardly affected 
by introducing correlation. At the same time, applying the correlation matrix   results in a 
smaller (greater) fraction of cases where         (      ) when      is low (high). The fol-
lowing table reports the exact number of simulations with correlated state variables leading 
to      {      }, and can be readily compared to tables 5 and 7 for the same results using 
uncorrelated state variable processes: 
           1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
0  #switches  0  59  302  423  557  508  641  659  1062  5789 
40  #switches  825  1089  1111  737  658  504  473  555  881  3167 
45  #switches  8233  431  193  85  89  55  89  90  132  603 
Table 9: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time    when       
        EUR/ton and the revenue, unit cost and CO2 price processes are correlated according to  .  
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper we evaluate the effects of downward limited stochastic CO2-prices on the in-
vestment decision of a profit maximizing energy producer. We apply an approach derived 
from real-option valuation and demonstrate that a CO2 price floor can be used to induce 
emitters to accelerate their investments in low-carbon technologies. Since the decarboni-
zation of the power sector, which accounts for a substantial proportion of total greenhouse 
gas emissions, is a conditio sine qua non for achieving lower emission targets, we choose 
this industry for our analysis. The key argument lies in the fact that the decision to invest in 
low-carbon generation technologies immediately may be superior to continuing to operate 
a high-carbon technology, especially in high permit price regimes. This decision is taken 
by comparing the expected net present value of an immediate clean investment to that 
resulting from the deferment of an investment. Our results based on Monte Carlo simula-
tions identify the appropriate level of a constant minimum CO2-price in our setting – imply-
ing an immediate “clean” investment – to fluctuate between 40 and 45 Euros per ton. An 
alternative solution is to introduce a fixed initial minimum price with a growth rate regime, 
as it is currently being implemented in the UK (HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs 
(2010)). Simulations reveal that under this approach, the starting CO2 price floor can be 
considerably lower, with its optimal level – unsurprisingly – depending on the growth rate. 
However, our results turn out to be relatively sensitive with respect to the model inputs. We 
perform extensive robustness checks and find patterns in the distribution of optimal switch-
ing times which enable us to derive robust findings. In particular, some parameter settings 
balance the optimal investment timing somewhere in the interior of the investment decision 
horizon. We use this observation to clearly identify the impacts of changes in the CO2 price 
floor, its growth rate, the drift and diffusion of the CO2 price process and the discount rate. 
Moreover, we demonstrate that the carbon market not only helps the regulator to meet 
emission targets in an allocationally efficient way, but can also be used as an instrument to 
stimulate the adoption of low-carbon technologies. Several political proposals (e.g. in Aus-
tralia, the UK and US) in the recent past support this view of the carbon market. Mean-
while it has become apparent that a permit trading system will not suffice as the sole driver 
in reaching the target of a decarbonized economy. A mixture of policy instruments will in-
stead be necessary to stabilize our climate. A carbon price floor is one such instrument, 
which is able to enhance the role of an emissions trading system in this process.  
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